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WHAT DETERS? STRENGTH, NOT WEAKNESS
Roger W. Barnett
In the turbulent years following the great Allied victory in World War II, thepolicy agenda for U.S. leaders overflowed. Demobilizing millions of service-
men and shifting the economy to a peacetime footing were among the vital orders
of the day. Yet the Cold War was dawning, and the military services—including
the newly constituted U.S. Air Force—were maneuvering for position. An en-
tirely new strategy had to be crafted in the wake of victory and for what was to be
called the “atomic age.” Scientists, military leaders, academics, civilian analysts,
and politicians lined up to offer their theories about the proper place of atomic
weapons in the new strategies being proposed. Everyone was sailing into un-
charted waters, without benefit of stars or reliable compasses.
One could argue today that with respect to nuclear weapons and nuclear
strategy American leaders got it right, or mostly right. After all, there was no
nuclear war, and after a bitter struggle the nation’s major competitor, the Soviet
Union, disappeared from the scene. No doubt some excesses resulted from the
competition between the superpowers, but they can be understood, even
excused, when one reflects on the deep hostility that existed between the two
systems. Secrecy and suspicion about intentions inflamed the relationship and
motivated the competitors to seek security in large arsenals of weapons, espe-
cially nuclear weapons.
Now, in the post–Cold War world, American leaders find themselves looking
again for navigational aids to guide them to safe
waters. In “The Dilemma of Nuclear Weapons in the
Twenty-first Century,” Admiral Stansfield Turner has
offered a chart and some sailing directions. Briefly,
“The Dilemma” argues that:
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Nuclear weapons are extraordinarily powerful, qualitatively different from
conventional explosives;
An arms race caused the Soviet Union and the United States to acquire
unnecessarily large inventories of nuclear weapons;
In any conceivable contingency, however effective nuclear weapons would
be militarily, their use would be too risky;
No attempt at a first strike could ever destroy enough enemy weapons to
prevent retaliation, the results of which would be unacceptable, since the
United States is deterred from a nuclear attack by the prospect of even a
single nuclear detonation on its soil, and other states are undoubtedly
deterred by the same considerations;
There are too many nuclear weapons in the world—reductions in U.S. and
Russian nuclear arsenals promised by START II to 3,500 warheads are not
deep enough and are too slow in any case;
“Strategic escrow”—removing ICBM warheads and storing them not less
than three hundred miles from their launchers—should be initiated
unilaterally by the United States, an action that in this view the Russians
would be obliged to reciprocate;
In four to five years Russia and the United States would have only about a
thousand warheads in strategic escrow;
The other six nuclear powers would then be invited to join a condominium
in which each would place in escrow all of its nuclear weapons, no more
than two hundred per country, under an international inspection regime;
The result would be a very stable world, in which the probability of
surprise nuclear attack would be zero, nuclear proliferation would be
discouraged, and momentum toward arms control would be restored.
The pivotal concept in this scheme is “existential deterrence.” The approach
and the term were coined almost twenty years ago by McGeorge Bundy, who ar-
gued that so long as one maintained the ability to deliver a nuclear retaliatory re-
sponse to an attack, deterrence would succeed.1 The mere existence of a response,
which would inevitably cause unacceptable damage to the aggressor’s home-
land, would deter nuclear attack. The proposition was attractive: it implied that
deterrence was stable and that it could be ensured by small nuclear forces.
The enormous power of nuclear weapons, setting them qualitatively apart
from other weapons, made existential deterrence possible. The vast uncertain-
ties of system reliabilities, accuracy, survivability, and strategies such as “launch
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on warning” shored up convictions on all sides that at least one retaliatory
weapon would detonate on the aggressor’s soil. No prospective attacking nation
could believe that its nuclear-armed adversary could be totally disarmed as the
result of a first strike; some small number of retaliatory weapons would reach
their targets—and the prospect of horrendous consequences would suffice to
deter.
In his review (entitled “I Exist, Therefore I Deter”) of Bundy’s argument,
Lawrence Freedman called the argument “immensely seductive,” in that “forces
are to be judged by essentially neg-
ative criteria: they should not be
vulnerable, provocative, disruptive
of arms control, or prone to acci-
dental detonation. So long as these
criteria are met it does not matter
what is procured, where and in what numbers it is deployed, and against what
it is targeted.”2 But are such criteria—and the argument that is founded on
them—valid?
If, indeed, nuclear-armed adversaries believe that a single nuclear detonation on
their territory would negate any possible strategic objectives they might have,
the logic of existential deterrence is persuasive. Bundy’s “Existential Deterrence”
and the central theme of “The Dilemma,” however, contain five severe, even de-
bilitating flaws: if its key assumption is wrong, this brand of deterrence could fail
catastrophically; the possibility of the United States extending deterrence to its
friends, allies, and those at risk of nuclear coercion would be nullified; the pros-
pects of the use of weapons of mass destruction against U.S. and allied forces
would increase; it not only weakens nuclear deterrence but encourages the prolif-
eration of nuclear weapons; and if increased national security is the objective of
the scheme, the proposal, by focusing on weapons—one of the means of war-
fare—addresses the wrong issue.
First, then, the question must be asked: What if the key assumption is incor-
rect? While the prospect of “five or ten” nuclear explosions on its territory might
well suffice to deter the United States, what if adversaries have different percep-
tions and dissimilar thresholds of pain?
The central premise of “The Dilemma” is rooted in unabashed mirror-imaging:
“I believe A; you are a rational person, so you must also believe A. The logic is so
strong that I require no evidence on which to base my conclusion.” This is a curi-
ous approach from the former director of the Central Intelligence Agency. It
claims that in order to infer the intentions of others, one need look no farther
than one’s own. If that were true, why would the United States need the CIA, or
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for that matter, any intelligence agency? If one can mirror-image in this, the
most vital of circumstances, with national survival at stake, why not in all lesser
cases?
The historical record indicates that belligerent states have often been able to
absorb great amounts of punishment. The premise of existential deterrence is
that attacks with nuclear weapons will be deterred confidently by the prospect of
a small retaliatory response. But how does that square with the ability of Ger-
many and Japan to fight on through devastating aerial bombardment in the Sec-
ond World War? States have withstood levels of destruction approaching those
claimed to underwrite mutual assured destruction, which “The Dilemma” cites
as “something like 40 percent of the Soviet Union’s industrial capacity and 25
percent of its population.” Indeed, by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, the
fledgling Soviet Union lost “34 per cent of her population, 32 per cent of her ag-
ricultural land, 54 per cent of her industry, and 89 per cent of her coal mines.”3 In
a more recent example, “UNICEF indicates that at least 300,000 Iraqi children
have died from illness, hunger, and disease as a result of the sanctions imposed
after the Gulf War. . . . [O]ther sources go as high as 1.5 million Iraqis.”4 This car-
nage has resulted from Saddam Hussein’s intransigence in refusing to comply
with UN Security Council resolutions; it is totally avoidable. Given these re-
ports, can one have high confidence that the prospect of a small number of nu-
clear detonations on Iraqi soil would be sufficient to deter Saddam, or others like
him, from a nuclear attack? Do the statements of Muammar Qadhafi—“If we had
possessed . . . missiles that could reach New York—we would have hit at the same
moment [of the 1986 U.S. raid on Libya]. Consequently, we should build this
force so that they and others will no longer think about an attack” —indicate
that he would be deterred?5 Does North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and
long-range missiles to deliver them argue that Kim Jong-il would be deterred
from using them by the prospect of a nuclear detonation on North Korean soil?
We cannot possibly know the answer to these questions. We know that poten-
tial adversaries are pursuing nuclear weapons and long-range delivery means.
We know also that nuclear deterrence has not failed—but that does not mean it
cannot. It might be true that “I Exist, Therefore I Deter”; but it might not. The
risks are of the greatest magnitude, however, and so are the possible conse-
quences. Existential deterrence is a prime example of a very risky and dangerous
approach to nuclear deterrence—for if it fails, it fails catastrophically.
One can agree that the detonation of a few nuclear weapons on American soil
would be the greatest disaster this country has ever experienced without taking
the leap of faith that one’s adversaries or potential adversaries would have the
same attitude. With no confirming evidence, believers in existential deterrence
project their beliefs and fears on others, reaching the conclusion that all must
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reason similarly. One is free to wonder, though, why the large risks involved
should be deliberately assumed.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, at the high point of the superpower nu-
clear arsenals, the United States measured “how much was enough” by the rub-
ber ruler of “assured destruction.” The assured-destruction criterion was
that nuclear forces had to be large
and robust enough to hold a spec-
ified, significant fraction of Soviet
population and industry at risk in
a retaliatory strike—that is, after
having absorbed a Soviet first strike.6 Yet the point continued to be reinforced
that the enemy’s prospect of certain loss had to be high if deterrence was to be reliable.
Moreover, deterrence is strengthened by availability. Would a prospective
robber be more likely deterred by a gun pointed at him or by one upstairs in a
dresser drawer? As Sir Michael Quinlan counsels, “Weapons deter by the possi-
bility of their use, and by no other route.”7
Small numbers invite malefactors to find ways to nullify them. In the case of
nuclear escrow, the small number of warheads would be in known locations,
because they would have to be monitored. It does not take a great amount of
imagination to think of ways to nullify small numbers of unusable warheads at
known locations, and the payoff from doing so would be very high; the tempta-
tion to acquire the capability to negate the escrowed weapons (or their owners’
ability to unite them with their delivery vehicles) could be irresistible.
In the final analysis, “a hundred weapons are not far more acceptable politi-
cally, more virtuous morally, safer, more stable in security terms, or even neces-
sarily many times less expensive than, say, a thousand.”8 The difference between
the approach taken by “The Dilemma” and one arguing that deterrent weapons
must be usable and numerous is that the former is based on an assumption that
deterrence cannot fail, and the latter on an assumption that it can. The prudent
course is clearly not the one suggested by “The Dilemma.”
The second key criticism of an embrace of existential deterrence is that it con-
tains no provision for extending deterrence. Since the middle of the twentieth
century the United States has provided a nuclear shield to its allies. Nato and the
Pacific allies (South Korea, Australia, and Japan, for example) have been the
clear beneficiaries of this policy. Further—and in direct contradiction of the
claim of “The Dilemma” that extended deterrence was “never a military strategy
but a budgetary one”—the United States provided the ultimate earnest of its
commitment to its allies: U.S. service members stationed forward. Unless one is
prepared cynically to insist that the U.S. fighting forces, hundreds of thousands
strong, stationed in allied countries were merely sacrificial tokens rather than
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couplings to the American strategic nuclear capability, one must consider that
extended deterrence was a genuine commitment on the part of the United States
to the defense of its allies.9 In the arrangement espoused by “The Dilemma,”
where nuclear arsenals would be held in escrow and could be used only in retali-
ation for a direct attack on one’s home territory, extended deterrence could not
function.
The third criticism asserts that if all nuclear weapons are placed in escrow, ad-
versaries will be strongly tempted to use not only nuclear weapons but chemical,
biological, or perhaps radiological weapons against U.S. forces in case of con-
flict. Given that American conventional forces are superior to all others in the
world and that the nation appears to intend to preserve that superiority in the
future, those who would engage U.S. forces militarily will be obliged to seek le-
verage in asymmetric ways, to level the battlespace. One such asymmetric
method would be to employ varieties of weapons of mass destruction. With nu-
clear weapons in escrow and unusable except in the most severe exigencies, and
having already foresworn possession or use of chemical and biological weapons,
the United States would have only conventional weapons with which to respond
to such attacks. Because the single data point on the subject—the restraint of
Saddam Hussein in not using chemical weapons in DESERT STORM—suggests
the value of nuclear weapons in deterring attacks by weapons of mass destruc-
tion, to relinquish all weapons of mass destruction would be to declare “open
season” for their use against the U.S. military.10
In the fourth place, the argument of “The Dilemma” stands both the evidence
and the logic of proliferation on its head. The claim is that “if the two nuclear
superpowers continue to need tens of thousands of nuclear warheads, other
nations of the world will say they need them as well.” There is, however, no
evidence to support such an assertion. When the Israeli Air Force attacked Iraq’s
Osirak reactor in 1981, it was not because Iraq was attempting to obtain nuclear
weapons to match those of the superpowers. Nuclear proliferation to India,
Pakistan, South Africa, and presumably to Israel cannot be attributed to that
cause either.
What the evidence shows instead is that “other nations” argue vigorously not
for large nuclear arsenals of their own but for the nuclear states to effect reduc-
tions in their stockpiles. Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
entreats all states to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures
relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to pursue nu-
clear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under
strict and effective international control.” In compliance with this obligation,
the United States reduced its inventory of nuclear weapons by more than half
during the 1990s.
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If a potential acquirer of nuclear weapons scans the strategic horizon and
sees super-states, with arsenals of nuclear weapons numbering in the thousands,
offering security assurances to those who refrain from acquiring weapons of
mass destruction, the aspirant may well be discouraged from developing or ob-
taining its own weapons. If, on
the other hand, the numbers in-
volved are in the hundreds, the
ante to join the nuclear club is
low, and even parity is achiev-
able. If, moreover, the means of retaliation are locked up in escrow rather than
immediately available, an adversary might look very differently on the value of
acquiring nuclear weapons. In such an instance an opportunity—and therefore
the temptation—to change the strategic balance decisively would have been cre-
ated where none existed before. Thus, logic would indicate that rather than
dampen proliferation, the proposed reductions in nuclear arsenals to very low
levels would stimulate proliferation. Indeed, low levels of warheads could trig-
ger clandestine programs and cheating, because of both the ease in attaining
competitive numbers and the anticipated leverage that would be attained. Un-
like legitimate weapons held openly in escrow, illegitimate covert weapons
would be usable.
Moreover, since escrow deliberately retards retaliation, an aggressor might
reason that either the condominium would significantly delay, if not prevent,
the removal of weapons from escrow, or indeed, that retaliation could be fore-
stalled altogether. If Russia and China had all their weapons in escrow, for exam-
ple, would they consent to allow the United States to remove some or all of its
weapons for use? Could they be certain that the United States was not scheming
to coerce them with the now-usable weapons? Would they not insist on remov-
ing their own weapons also, thereby precipitating a most deadly crisis? Even if
consent were forthcoming, an adversary might believe that the time it would
take the United States to bring the weapons to usable condition might offer time
for negotiation—that it could negotiate something less than a nuclear retalia-
tory response. Given these considerations and the absence of extended deter-
rence noted earlier, proliferation would look a lot more attractive than it does
currently, or would even under any official approach toward the ultimate size
and disposition of the U.S. nuclear arsenal.
Fifth and finally, “The Dilemma,” like many arms control proposals, is fo-
cused sharply on nuclear weapons. It laments the facts that nuclear weapons are
so powerful and that there are so many of them in the world. Acknowledging
that impressive strides have been taken to reduce nuclear arsenals, “The Dilemma”
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nevertheless conveys impatience at the tempo of reductions and offers a scheme
to render them more safe while reducing their numbers dramatically.
It emphasizes—and demonizes—the weapons. It renders nuclear yields, for
example, in terms not of kilotons, which is the convention, but of pounds of
TNT equivalent. The twelve-kiloton Hiroshima bomb is presented as having
yielded twenty-five million pounds of TNT equivalent. A similar rhetorical de-
vice is used to make numbers of weapons appear shocking. The figure of 32,500
“nuclear warheads” in the year 1969 is juxtaposed against “less than two hun-
dred cities with populations of more than a hundred thousand in the Soviet
Union.” But clearly the majority of those warheads were not designed for use
against Soviet cities, nor could they have been so employed—atomic mines,
antisubmarine and antiair weapons, and artillery shells come to mind.
Ultimately, however, as Colin Gray reminds us, it is not weapons but who
owns them that matters: “Clear military advantage on the side of order is a force
for peace. . . . For an extreme example, an Iraqi ICBM [intercontinental ballistic
missile] force would not be the same as the U.S. ICBM force, no matter how sim-
ilar the two forces might be in their technical characteristics and standard prac-
tices of operation.”11 To which point George Will adds: “Arms control as its
believers envision it—agreements making the world safer by limiting technol-
ogy—rests on the notion that the threat to peace is technological, not political,
that the threat is the nature of particular weapons, not of particular regimes.”12
Winston Churchill appreciated the point also; he “unhesitatingly endorsed the
Western monopoly of the atomic bomb, emphasizing his opposition to entrust-
ing U.S. and British knowledge of its secrets to the UN. ‘It would be criminal
madness to cast it adrift in this still agitated and un-united world,’ he warned.
No country had slept less well because the secrets of the bomb were held in
American hands, but this would not have been the case had ‘some Communist
or neo-Fascist state monopolised for the time being these dread agencies.’”13
The focus on nuclear weapons, the means, devalues the more important ques-
tions: the objectives for which conflict is waged—the ends; and how conflicts are
conducted—the ways. Nuclear weapons are not the enemy. By making them the
enemy, the United States weakens itself vis-à-vis its real and prospective adversaries.
Ultimately, then, “The Dilemma” counsels an approach based on weakness,
not strength. Responsible U.S. leaders have been very consistent on the point.
President John F. Kennedy warned in his 1961 inaugural address, “We dare not
tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt
can we be certain beyond doubt that they will never be employed.”14 His caution
was echoed forty years later in the remarks of Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld at his initial news briefing: “A strong military does not guarantee peace
and stability in the world, but we know that the opposite is true—that weakness is
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provocative, that it does invite and entice people into doing things they would
otherwise avoid, and our task is to see that we fashion deterrence to fit in this
new national security environment.”15 In sharp contrast, “The Dilemma” asks
that the United States: forgo its strategy of deterrence based on the expectation
of prompt, severe retaliation; abandon its policy of extended deterrence; and in-
stead accept high risks, even in effect tempting the use of weapons of mass de-
struction against its military, or even its homeland.
Still, despite the weakness and risk that must be assumed in moving toward a
nuclear posture advocated in “The Dilemma,” one can agree that the detonation
of a single nuclear warhead on American soil would be a catastrophe of the
greatest magnitude. For a variety
of reasons, that is a possibility to-
day, and its probability is increas-
ing with the passage of time. Even
with large, ready nuclear forces,
deterrence can fail. It would be the height of irresponsibility to believe, and to
act on the belief, that deterrence cannot fail.
The detonation of a single nuclear warhead on U.S. soil would constitute an
event from which the United States might never recover. The loss of confidence
by the citizenry in the ability of the U.S. Department of Defense to protect them
would be incalculable. The bond of trust that, at the most elementary level, the
people will be kept secure would be sundered. What subsequent action could re-
dress such a betrayal? A retaliatory attack that murdered thousands of innocents
in the country of the aggressor might be delivered, to deter additional attacks
from the original perpetrator or others watching the drama unfold. Even that,
however, would be both unsatisfying and of highly questionable morality.
If the detonation of a single weapon on American territory, then, is truly
unacceptable, the appropriate strategic response is not to shrink the U.S. nuclear
arsenal and place it in unusable escrow. A better risk-reducing solution is to con-
struct defenses against nuclear attack.
Today, arms control is preventing the United States both from reducing its
strategic nuclear arsenal to levels that it would prefer (the START process) and
from obtaining effective defenses (the ABM Treaty). In each instance, arms
control gives Russia a veto on decisions of greatest import to U.S. security. An
approach preferable to that presented in “The Dilemma” might be to withdraw
from the START II Treaty and the ABM Treaty—bilateral treaties with the Soviet
Union, a country that no longer exists. This could be done without abrogating
either treaty; withdrawal is provided for in both instruments, and to take advan-
tage of those clauses is to abide by the treaties’ provisions. In any case, arms con-
trol exists to control adversarial competition in weaponry. Russia and the United
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States today are not adversaries. President George W. Bush put it straightfor-
wardly in 2000, as a candidate: “Russia itself is no longer our enemy. The cold
war logic that led to the creation of massive stockpiles on both sides is now out-
dated. Our mutual security need no longer depend on a nuclear balance of ter-
ror.”16 Therefore, arms control between the two countries is unnecessary and
irrelevant. Each should be free to pursue its own strategic agenda.
The United States does not owe Russia, China, or any other country an unop-
posed opportunity to kill its citizens. Arguments claiming that missile defenses
“threaten” the deterrents of other states must be rebutted in plain language: such
defenses threaten only the ability of others to kill U.S. citizens in large numbers
by means of ballistic missile attack. An argument that missile defenses
threaten the deterrent capabilities of other states must be accompanied by
some sense of what actions by the United States those deterrents are seeking to
forestall. In other words, why does China or Russia require the unchallenged
ability to exterminate American citizens in their homes? Why should the United
States specifically grant such a capability? As Henry Kissinger has argued, “De-
liberate vulnerability, when technology is available to avoid it, cannot be a stra-
tegic objective, cannot be a political objective, and cannot be a moral objective
of any American president.”17
A perfect “Astrodome” defense—an impermeable “roof ”—is unnecessary. It
is at the same time the wrong policy objective and the straw-man target of crit-
ics. Instead, by significantly complicating the strategic calculus, defenses offer
important benefits regardless of how well they might actually perform. This is true
because any adversary contemplating attacking in the face of missile defenses is
obliged to believe they will work, and work well. The credibility of American de-
fenses would be underwritten by the military and technological power of the
United States. What prospective attacker would consider a defensive system
built by the United States and confidently tell itself, “The U.S. defense is junk,
our warheads will penetrate it”?
The U.S. strategic approach should be to reduce its inventory of strategic of-
fensive weapons to levels that would ensure a strong, secure strategic reserve
against any prospective threat, and to construct a national missile defense on a
priority basis. The missile defense would seek to limit damage in the event of the
failure of deterrence and to protect the United States actively against nuclear
blackmail, as well as against accidental or unauthorized attack. President Bush
addressed both sides of the equation in a speech on 1 May 2001: “We need a new
framework that allows us to build missile defenses to counter the different
threats of today’s world. . . . I am committed to achieving a credible deterrent
with the lowest-possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our na-
tional security needs.”18
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In summary, rather than take the high-risk course that leads to extremely
deep reductions and nuclear escrow, the United States would be far better off to
maintain a secure, capable strategic reserve and construct missile defenses to
protect its people. The nation needs a “shield of dreams,” as Senator Joseph
Biden has derisively called it.19 With a defense in place against ballistic missile at-
tack, no challenger would be tempted to attack. Shield of dreams? That’s right:
“Build it and they won’t come.”
N O T E S
1. See McGeorge Bundy, “The Bishops and the
Bomb,” New York Review of Books, 16 June
1983.
2. Lawrence Freedman, “I Exist, Therefore I Deter,”
International Security, Summer 1988, pp. 184–5.
3. Edward Mead Earle, “Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin:
Soviet Concepts of War,” in Makers of Modern
Strategy, ed. Edward Mead Earle (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1943), p. 327.
4. Waleed Najeeb and Tom Seery, “U.S. Wrong
on Iraqi Sanctions,” Milwaukee Journal Senti-
nel, 10 September 2000, available on the
World Wide Web: Early Bird, http://ebird.
dtic.mil.
5. Muammar Qadhafi, speech to students of the
Higher Institute for Applied Social Studies at
the Great al-Fatih University, 18 April 2000,
trans. FBIS Daily Reports: Near East and South
Asia (FBIS-NES-90-078), 23 April 1990, p. 8.
6. “Rubber ruler” recalls that the prescribed
fractions of population and industry varied
over time. In 1965, mutual assured destruc-
tion was said to require the capability to de-
stroy a quarter to a third of the population,
plus two-thirds of the industry of the Soviet
Union, after riding out a Soviet first strike
(U.S. Dept. of Defense, Report of the Secretary
of Defense on the FY66–70 Defense Program
[Washington, D.C.: Govt. Print. Off., 1965]).
In 1967 the requirement changed to from a
fifth to a quarter of the USSR’s population
plus one-half to two-thirds of its industry
(U.S. Dept. of Defense, Report of the Secretary
of Defense on the FY68–72 Defense Program
[Washington, D.C.: Govt. Print. Off., 1967]).
Then, in 1968, it was adjusted downward to
from one-fifth to one-quarter of the Soviet
population plus half of the nation’s industry
(U.S. Dept. of Defense, Report of the Secretary
of Defense on the FY69–73 Defense Program
[Washington, D.C.: Govt. Print. Off., 1968]).
The declining fractions reflected an apprecia-
tion of the increases in the quantity, accuracy,
and yield of Soviet weapons, reducing the
number of U.S. weapons that would survive a
first strike and thus be available for retaliation.
7. Thinking about Nuclear Weapons (London:
Royal United Services Institute for Defence
Studies, 1997), p. 15.
8. Ibid., p. 54.
9. As Robert Jervis has written, “Many analysts
believe . . . that allies cannot be sheltered un-
der the nuclear umbrella and that ‘extended
deterrence’ is a fiction. As I have argued else-
where, however, both logic and the historical
record indicate that this position is not true.”
See his “The Future of World Politics: Will It
Resemble the Past?” International Security,
Winter 1991–92, p. 48.
10. Regarding Iraqi restraint, “In a variety of
ways, including a direct meeting with Tariq
Aziz, the Iraqi foreign minister, the American
secretary of state, James A. Baker, warned
Saddam Hussein that the use of chemical or
biological weapons against allied forces
would be met by ‘the most severe conse-
quences.’ The Iraqis did not use these weap-
ons and later said they understood the
American warning to mean a nuclear re-
sponse.” Michael Oreskes, “Troubling the
Waters of Nuclear Deterrence,” New York
Times, 4 June 2000, p. IV-3. Keith B. Payne
put it this way: “The evidence that nuclear
deterrence was necessary to deter the Iraqi
use of chemical weapons during the Gulf War
is not trivial. . . . Tariq Aziz has stated that
3 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
11
Barnett: What Deters? Strength, Not Weakness
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2001
Iraq was deterred from using its weapons of
mass destruction during the war because
Saddam Hussein interpreted Washington’s
various threats of grievous retaliation as
meaning nuclear retaliation.” The Case
against Nuclear Abolition and for Nuclear De-
terrence (Fairfax, Va.: National Institute for
Public Policy, December 1997), p. 30.
11. Colin S. Gray, House of Cards: Why Arms
Control Must Fail (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ.
Press, 1992). See also his Weapons Don’t
Make War: Policy, Strategy, and Military
Technology (Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas,
1993).
12. George Will, “The Arms Control Fetish,”
Washington Post, 21 September 1995, p. 31.
13. Quoted in Spencer Warren, “Churchill’s Re-
alism: Reflections on the Fulton Speech,” Na-
tional Interest, Winter 1995/96, p. 48. Cf.:
“There is no real security in being just as
strong as a potential enemy; there is security
only in being a little stronger. There is no
possibility of action if one’s strength is fully
checked; there is a chance for a positive for-
eign policy only if there is a margin of force
which can be freely used.” Nicholas J.
Spykman, America’s Strategy in World Politics:
The United States and the Balance of Power
(1942; repr. Hamden, Conn.: Archon, 1970),
p. 21.
14. Reprinted in U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, 6
February 1961, pp. 175–6.
15. U.S. Dept. of Defense, transcript of news
briefing, Secretary of Defense Donald H.
Rumsfeld, 26 January 2001 (available elec-
tronically from the Defense Technical Infor-
mation Service: dltranscripts_sender
@dtic.mil).
16. “Excerpts from Bush’s Remarks on National
Security and Arms Policy,” New York Times,
24 May 2000, available on the World Wide
Web: Early Bird, http://ebird.dtic.mil.
17. Henry Kissinger, quoted in “Bush’s Break-
through,” Wall Street Journal, 25 May 2000,
available on the World Wide Web: Early Bird,
http://ebird.dtic.mil.
18. “Remarks by the President to Students and
Faculty at National Defense University, 1
May 2001,” retrieved from the World Wide
Web: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2001/05/text/20010501-10.html.
19. Quoted in Robin Wright, “Powell Puts U.S.
on Pedestal, Observers Say,” Los Angeles
Times, 28 January 2001, p. 4. The allusion is
to the 1989 Universal movie Field of Dreams,
in which the main character is mysteriously
urged by a disembodied voice to construct a
baseball field on his property: “If you build it,
they will come.”
B A R N E T T 3 5
12
Naval War College Review, Vol. 54 [2001], No. 2, Art. 4
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol54/iss2/4
